Cryonics, euthanasia, and the doctrine of double effect.

In 1989, Thomas Donaldson requested the California courts to allow physicians to hasten his death. Donaldson had been diagnosed with brain cancer, and he desired to die in order to cryonically preserve his brain, so as to stop its further deterioration. This case elicits an important question: is this a case of euthanasia? In this article, we examine the traditional criteria of death, and contrast it with the information-theoretic criterion. If this criterion is accepted, we posit that Donaldson's case would have been cryocide, but not euthanasia. We then examine if cryocide is an ethically feasible alternative to euthanasia. To do so, we rely on the ethical doctrine of double effect.

The principle of double effect and external whistleblowing in nursing.

Nurses are generally expected to raise concerns when a harm or wrongdoing is committed against patients. Should their concerns not be adequately addressed, then nurses may take the decision to engage in external whistleblowing. Given that it could have a negative effect on the health care organization or service, nurses may question whether they should engage in external whistleblowing. Consequently, is there an ethical criterion to discern whether the negative effect on the health care organization or service is ethically permissible? This paper argues for the suitability of the Principle of Double Effect as an ethical criterion. The position of this paper is that external whistleblowing by a nurse when understood as an advocacy act with two effects (i.e. the effect of defending a patient and the further negative effect on the health care organization or service) can be ethically permissible through meeting the conditions of the Principle of Double Effect.

Goods, causes and intentions: problems with applying the doctrine of double effect to palliative sedation.

BACKGROUND: Palliative sedation and analgesia are employed in patients with refractory and intractable symptoms at the end of life to reduce their suffering by lowering their level of consciousness. The doctrine of double effect, a philosophical principle that justifies doing a "good action" with a potentially "bad effect," is frequently employed to provide an ethical justification for this practice. MAIN TEXT: We argue that palliative sedation and analgesia do not fulfill the conditions required to apply the doctrine of double effect, and therefore its use in this domain is inappropriate. Furthermore, we argue that the frequent application of the doctrine of double effect to palliative sedation and analgesia reflects physicians' discomfort with the complex moral, intentional, and causal aspects of end-of-life care. CONCLUSIONS: We are concerned that this misapplication of the doctrine of double effect can consequently impair physicians' ethical reasoning and relationships with patients at the end of life.

Opioids, Double Effect, and the Prospects of Hastening Death.

The relevance of double effect for end-of-life decision-making has been challenged recently by a number of scholars. The principal reason is that opioids such as morphine do not usually hasten death when administered to relieve pain at the end of life; therefore, no secondary "double" effect is brought about. In my article, I argue against this view, showing how the doctrine of double effect is relevant to the administration of opioids at the end of life. I contend that the prevailing view suffers from a misunderstanding of the nature of double effect, which includes application to risking a grave harm.

The Doctrine of Double Effect and Potential Criminal Liability of Medical Practitioners in Australia.

Recent parliamentary inquiries into end-of-life choices identify the need to provide legal certainty for health practitioners working in end-of-life care. A concern identified is the lack of clarity surrounding the operation, status and application of the doctrine of double effect. This discussion clarifies these concerns. Although the doctrine is judicially recognised in several overseas jurisdictions, in Australia the doctrine of precedent means that it does not form part of the common law. In most jurisdictions, the fault element for murder includes recklessness, and application of the doctrine does not avoid criminal liability being established against orthodox criminal law principles. Although the prosecution of a medical practitioner who incidentally causes death in the proper course of medical treatment is a rare event, it remains a live issue. Legislative protection of medical practitioners, as has occurred in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia, is the means to achieve the certainty sought.

Palliative Sedation, Compassionate Extubation, and the Principle of Double Effect: An Ethical Analysis.

Palliative sedation is a well-recognized and commonly used medical practice at the end of life for patients who are experiencing refractory symptoms that cannot be controlled by other means of medical management. Given concerns about potentially hastening death by suppressing patients' respiratory drive, traditionally this medical practice has been considered ethically justifiable via application of the ethical doctrine known as the Principle of Double Effect. And even though most recent evidence suggests that palliative sedation is a safe and effective practice that does not hasten death when the sedative medications are properly titrated, the Principle of Double Effect is still commonly utilized to justify the practice of palliative sedation and any risk-however small-it may entail of hastening the death of patients. One less common clinical scenario where the Principle of Double Effect may still be appropriate ethical justification for palliative sedation is when the practice of palliative sedation is pursued concurrently with the active withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment-particularly the practice of compassionate extubation. This case study then describes an unconventional case of palliative sedation with concurrent compassionate extubation where Principle of Double Effect reasoning was effectively employed to ethically justify continuing to palliatively sedate a patient during compassionate extubation.

[Extreme end-of-life situations and opioids : the double effect principle, a helpful guide]. / Situations extrêmes de fin de vie et opioïdes : le principe du double effet, une aide bienvenue !

The death of a patient taking opioids can generate strong feelings of guilt. « Have I hastened my patient's death by my administration of opioids ? ¼ Doubts may arise in certain situations, despite the proven safety of appropriate opioid use in the management of dyspnea and pain in the palliative care setting. Fearing the harms of opioid administration, some medical practitioners may undertreat patients, forsaking them to suffering. Other doctors, desperate to relieve their excruciating suffering at all cost, may in fact have recourse to euthanizing acts. This article seeks to answer this ethical dilemma with an overview of the double effect principle.

La mort d'un patient en situation palliative sous opioïde génère parfois un fort sentiment de culpabilité. « Ai-je précipité le décès du patient avec mon traitement opioïde ? ¼ Bien que la littérature soit très claire quant à la sécurité des opioïdes utilisés correctement pour la gestion de la dyspnée ou de la douleur en soins palliatifs, il se peut que, dans certaines situations, on puisse en douter. Le médecin, face à sa crainte de nuire en administrant des opioïdes, pourrait être tenté de sous-traiter le patient, au risque de l'abandonner à sa souffrance. D'un autre côté, l'impuissance face à l'intensité de la souffrance du patient pourrait amener le médecin à vouloir le soulager à tout prix, au risque d'un geste euthanasiant. Cet article propose un aperçu du principe du double effet, comme élément de réponse à ce dilemme éthique.

Continuous deep sedation and the doctrine of double effect: Do physicians not intend to make the patient unconscious until death if they gradually increase the sedatives?

Continuous deep sedation (CDS) has the effect of making the patient unconscious until death, and that it has this effect is clearly an undesirable aspect of CDS. However, some authors have recently maintained that many physicians do not intend this effect when practicing CDS. According to these authors, CDS is differentiated into two types; in what is called "gradual" CDS (or CDS as a result of proportionate palliative sedation), physicians start with low doses of sedatives and increase them only gradually, whereas in "rapid" CDS (or palliative sedation to unconsciousness), physicians rapidly administer a heavy dose that clearly induces unconsciousness from the beginning. The claim is that the physicians intend permanent unconsciousness only if they rapidly administer a heavy dose, but they do not intend it when the unconsciousness is the result of a gradual increase of sedatives. This paper attempts to refute these claims based on a close examination of the protocol of gradual CDS. If my argument is valid, the doctrine of double effect would not be useful in justifying most, if not all, cases of CDS.

Ethical end-of-life palliative care: response to Riisfeldt.

In a recent article, 1 Riisfeldt attempts to show that the principle of double effect (PDE) is unsound as an ethical principle and problematic in its application to palliative opioid and sedative use in end-of-life care. Specifically, he claims that (1) routine, non-lethal opioid and sedative administration may be "intrinsically bad" by PDE's standards, (2) continuous deep palliative sedation (or "terminal sedation") should be treated as a bad effect akin to death for purposes of PDE, (3) PDE cannot coherently be applied in cases where death "indirectly" furthers an agent's intended end of pain relief via medically appropriate palliative care, and (4) application of PDE requires sacrificing common beliefs about the sanctity of human life. I respond by showing that Riisfeldt's understanding of PDE is seriously mistaken: he misattributes Kantian and Millian reasoning to the principle and conflates acts' intrinsic properties with their effects. Further, a corrected understanding of PDE can address Riisfeldt's case-specific objections.

[Bioethics theories, the protection of life and natural law]. / Teorías bioéticas, protección de la vida y ley natural.

Principlist Bioethics by Beauchamp and Childress has reached a prominent status in contemporary Bioethics. Nevertheless, it includes some important theoretical problems: some lacks when defining some concepts, a tendency to ethical relativism, etc. Among the ethical alternative approaches from which such problems can be solved, we think that the most appropiate is the Natural Law theory. It offers a reasoned reflection on the concept of good and on human basic goods and their relation with moral general principles. From such goods, this ethical theory supports the existence of actions that are always maleficent acts, that is, intrinsically and universally evil acts. The article applies the Natural Law theory to issues related to the protection of human life (abortion, euthanasia, self-defense and genetic manipulation)..

Responsabilidad penal médica: consideraciones en la aplicación del principio del doble efecto / Medical Criminal Liability: considerations in the application of the principle of double effect

La responsabilidad médica en Chile contempla un espacio de discrecionalidad, en situaciones de peligro para la mujer durante el embarazo y en el tratamiento paliativo de pacientes terminales. En estos casos se presentan conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, en el ordenamiento jurídico chileno, que requieren de una propuesta interpretativa en consonancia con la protección del derecho a la vida, en actividades médicas que tengan por efecto colateral la muerte de personas inocentes (AU).

The chilean medical liability leaves a room of discretion in cases when a hazardous condition exists during the pregnancy or palliative care for those dying from a terminal disease. In such cases, the Chilean legal system presents undefined legal concepts. This concepts need to be in accordance with the promotion of the constitutional right to life, in medical cases where innocent people could die by side effect (AU).

Responsabilidad penal médica: consideraciones en la aplicación del principio del doble efecto / Medical Criminal Liability: considerations in the application of the principle of double effect

La responsabilidad médica en Chile contempla un espacio de discrecionalidad, en situaciones de peligro para la mujer durante el embarazo y en el tratamiento paliativo de pacientes terminales. En estos casos se presentan conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, en el ordenamiento jurídico chileno, que requieren de una propuesta interpretativa en consonancia con la protección del derecho a la vida, en actividades médicas que tengan por efecto colateral la muerte de personas inocentes (AU).

The chilean medical liability leaves a room of discretion in cases when a hazardous condition exists during the pregnancy or palliative care for those dying from a terminal disease. In such cases, the Chilean legal system presents undefined legal concepts. This concepts need to be in accordance with the promotion of the constitutional right to life, in medical cases where innocent people could die by side effect (AU).

Characterization of the Ovarian Tumor Peptidome.

Aberrant degradation of proteins is associated with many pathological states, including cancers. Mass spectrometric analysis of the tumor peptidome has the potential to provide biological insights on proteolytic processing in cancer. However, attempts to use the tumors peptidome information in cancer research have been fairly limited to date, largely due to the lack of effective approaches for robust peptidomics identification and quantification, and the prevalence of confounding factors and biases associated with sample handling and processing. To address this need, we have recently developed an effective and robust analytical platform as well as a novel informatics approach for comprehensive analyses of tissue peptidomes. The ability of this new peptidomics pipeline for high-throughput, comprehensive, and quantitative peptidomics analysis, as well as the suitability of clinical ovarian tumor samples with postexcision delay limited to less than 60min before freezing for peptidomics analysis, has been demonstrated. These initial analyses set a stage for further determination of molecular details and functional significance of the peptidomic activities in ovarian cancer.

Does the doctrine of double effect apply to the prescription of barbiturates? Syme vs the Medical Board of Australia.

The doctrine of double effect (DDE) is a principle of crucial importance in law and medicine. In medicine, the principle is generally accepted to apply in cases where the treatment necessary to relieve pain and physical suffering runs the risk of hastening the patient's death. More controversially, it has also been used as a justification for withdrawal of treatment from living individuals and physician-assisted suicide. In this paper, I will critique the findings of the controversial Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) hearing Syme vs the Medical Board of Australia In that hearing, Dr Rodney Syme, a urologist and euthanasia advocate, was defending his practice of prescribing barbiturates to terminally ill patients. Syme claimed that he prescribed the drugs with the intention of relieving their existential suffering and not to assist in suicide; he argued that the DDE could be applied. Pace VCAT, I argue that this is an illegitimate application of DDE. I argue that a close scrutiny of Syme's actions reveals that, at the very least, he intended to give patients the option of suicide. He furthermore used what on a traditional definition of DDE would be considered a 'bad' means-the prescription of Nembutal-to achieve a 'good' end-the relief of suffering. The case demonstrates the crucial importance of analysing an agent's 'intention' and the 'effects' of their actions when applying DDE. Ethicists and, indeed, the judiciary need to attend to the ethical complexities of DDE when they assess the applicability of DDE to end of life care. If they fail to do this, the doctrine risks losing its legitimacy as an ethical principle.

Double trouble: Addressing stunting and obesity via school nutrition

Background. South Africa (SA), as a middle-income country, faces the nutrition transition and associated double burden of undernutrition and obesity. School feeding programmes are one way of ensuring that malnutrition in children is addressed, but questions remain about whether they can address both undernutrition and obesity.Objectives. To compare the obesity and stunting outcomes for children receiving different combinations of school feeding programmes in a rural district of SA.Methods. The evaluation involved a comparative design that compared the stunting obesity levels of three groups of children. Group 1 received one lunch meal a day for a prolonged period, group 2 both lunch and breakfast, and group 3 had started receiving a daily lunch shortly before the commencementofthresearch.Results. Group 1 had stunting levels in line with the national average. Group 2 had lower stunting levels than those receiving only the lunch meal. Children from group 3 had lower stunting levels than groups 1 and 2. Rates of obesity and overweight were markedly different between the groups. Group 3 had very high rates of overweight and obesity ­ above the national average of 28%. In contrast, group 1 had far lower rates of overweight and obesity, and group 2exhibited the lowest levels. There was a significant decrease in the percentage of learners classified as overweight in group 3 over the 6-month period, from 26.1% to 19.2%.Conclusion. One lunch meal a day is associated with positive outcomes in relation to rates of stunting and obesity, and the lowest rates of obesity were measured when a breakfast meal was added. The addition of a breakfast meal to a lunch feeding programme shows promise,but this requires further investigation to understand whether causal linkages exist

Controlled drugs and the principle of double effect: the role of the district nurse.

The role of district nurses in the effective management of pain in palliative care has been strengthened by the Misuse of Drugs (Amendment No.2) (England, Wales and Scotland) Regulations 2012 that allow district nurses who are independent or supplementary prescribers to prescribe and administer controlled drugs. However, prescribing controlled drugs brings increased responsibility and accountability for the safe management of these medicines. In this article Richard Griffith considers the principle of double effect that seeks to ensure that patients in intractable pain receive the analgesia they require to manage that pain while district nurses avoid liability and prosecution under the law of murder.

Aproximación ética científica al doble efecto o único bien posible en el aborto terapéutico / Scientific ethical approach to double effect or only possible good in therapeutic abortion / Aproximação ética científica ao duplo efeito ou único bem possível no aborto terapêutico

El estudio muestra como la doctrina o principio del doble efecto (DDE) de una acción con efecto secundario negativo no puede aplicarse a todos los casos de aborto terapéutico (AT). Con el análisis de las causas e indicación de AT se demuestra que solo algunos de estos corresponden a DDE. Cuando no es el feto el que lleva a la madre a tener un embarazo de alto riesgo con amenaza de daño severo o muerte para ella, el caso puede adscribirse a la DDE; cuando es el feto directa o indirectamente el que causa a lleva a ese riesgo materno, el caso no se adscribe a la DDE. Si el feto es la causa de la muerte inminente de la madre, la remoción de la causa, que es la terapia adecuada, coincide con matarlo; entonces la acción buena (salvar a la madre tratándola causalmente) es la misma que la mala (matar al feto), situación que no puede asimilarse sea a la DDE o a la doctrina del mal menor. Más aún, decidir no interrumpir el embarazo produciría la muerte de la madre y el feto. El caso debería adscribirse al principio del único bien posible.

This study shows the inapplicability of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to all the cases of therapeutic abortion (TA). The causes of the maternal risk define cases that cannot be included in the DDE. When it is not the embryo or fetus that produces the mother pathology the case can be assigned to the DDE. When the embryo or fetus produces directly or indirectly the process that threatens the mother’s life the case cannot be assigned to the DDE. If the fetus is the cause of the imminent mother’s death, the removal of the cause, that is the proper therapy, coincides with killing him or her; then the good action (to save therapeutically the mother) is the same to the bad action (to kill the fetus) and this situation cannot be assimilated either to the DDE or to the doctrine of the lesser evil. Deciding not to kill the fetus will produce the death of the mother and the fetus. So this situation should be ascribed to the principle of the unique possible well.

O estudo mostra como a doutrina ou princípio do duplo efeito (DDE) de uma ação com efeito secundário negativo não pode aplicar-se a todos os casos de aborto terapêutico (AT). Com a análise das causas e indicação de AT se demonstra que só alguns destes correspondem a DDE. Quando não é o feto que leva a mãe a ter uma gravidez de alto risco com ameaça de dano severo ou morte para ela, o caso pode circunscrever-se à DDE; quando é o feto direta ou indiretamente quem causa ou leva a esse risco materno, o caso não se circunscreve a DDE. Se o feto é a causa da morte iminente da mãe, a remoção da causa, que é a terapia adequada, coincide em matá-lo; então a ação boa (salvar a mãe tratando-a causalmente) é a mesma que a má (matar o feto), situação que não pode assimilar-se à DDE ou à doutrina do mal menor. Mais ainda, decidir não interromper a gravidez produziria a morte da mãe e do feto. O caso deveria circunscrever-se ao princípio do único bem possível.